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[Australian courts are already dealing with issues around 
electronic documents and technology in the pre-trial and trial 
stages of litigation, in particular in cases involving large 
volumes of documentation. However issues surrounding the 
ease with which such documents can be disseminated have 
troubled the courts. The adoption of new technology is 
gathering pace, but the courts are proceeding with caution.]  
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In matters involving large volumes of documents which must be gathered, 
sorted, indexed and classified it has been common for some time for 
litigation practitioners to use information technology as an aid in document 
management. 
 
More recently the benefits of technology for the conduct of a trial have 
become apparent. A number of courtrooms have been set up in Australia, 
either as permanent “electronic courts”1, or for the conduct of particular large 
scale litigation.  
 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology.  
1 There is no clear definition of what is encompassed by the term “electronic court” 
as there is an almost endless range of features which are possible. A number of 
features are now part of the expected armoury of a fully equipped “electronic court”. 
These features are considered at IV below. 
          DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                             VOLUME 12 NO 1 82
The Victorian Supreme Court can boast its 13th court – one of the world’s 
most modern courtrooms, specially equipped in 1999 for high-tech cases.2 
Although some major cases have been conducted in that court using world-
leading technology, it was revealed at the time of release of that court’s then 
new Practice Note in 20023 that as at that date such cases had involved less 
than one percent of the legal profession.4 
 
The position in New South Wales has been similar, with technology used in 
some of the Royal Commissions of Inquiry, as for example the Special 
Commission of Inquiry into the Glenbrook Rail Accident (Glenbrook 
Inquiry) and the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Waterfall Rail 
Accident (McInerney Inquiry) although in real terms it is still the case that a 
very limited number of hearings have been conducted electronically. 
 
As the benefits that technology can bring to large scale litigation have 
become apparent to the courts they have one by one been introducing practice 
notes on the use of information technology in appropriate cases both during 
discovery and at trial. These practice notes “encourage”, rather than mandate, 
the use of technology pre-trial and at trial. In most of the matters which have 
proceeded to trial electronically this has been with the agreement and 
cooperation of the parties and their representatives. It is now clear, however, 
that in appropriate cases and despite opposition from one or more of the 
parties involved, the courts will direct that technology be used at trial.5 
 
The purpose of this article is to consider in the light of the recent decisions 
the role that technology may play in the litigation process and a range of 
associated legal issues which will undoubtedly require further exploration as 
technology becomes increasingly integrated into everyday litigation practice.  
 
                                                 
2 Prue Innes (Courts Information Officer), “Restored Supreme Court uses Latest 
Court Technology”, Supreme Court of Victoria Media Release, 11.10.99. 
http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/MediaReleases/$
file/Media-Latest %20Court%20Technology.pdf 
3 Practice Note No 1 of 2002, Guidelines for the use of Technology in any Civil 
Matter, published 29.4.02. See now Practice Note No 1 of 2007, Guidelines for the 
Use of Technology in any Civil Litigation Matter. 
4 Prue Innes (Courts Information Officer), “Technology in Court expands at Supreme 
Court”, Supreme Court Supreme Court of Victoria Media Release, 20.5.2002 at 
http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/MediaReleases/$
file/Media-TechnologyinCourt.pdf, accessed 20.08.07. 
5
 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [6] [2000] NSWSC 338; Harris 
Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407.  
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II PRACTICE NOTES – THE AUSTRALIAN LANDSCAPE 
 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales published Practice Note No 105 
Use of Technology in Civil Litigation in March 1999. That set the scene for 
the use of technology as an everyday tool in civil litigation in New South 
Wales. The New South Wales Note was used to some extent as a starting 
point for other jurisdictions although there are significant variations across 
jurisdictions. The note has been replaced several times since6, with the 
current note being Practice Note No SC Gen 7 Supreme Court – Use of 
Technology, which commenced on 1 September 2006. 
  
In Victoria, Practice Note 3 of 1999 was issued in April 1999. Following 
review of that Note, a new Practice Note, No 1 of 2002 Guidelines for the use 
of Technology in any Civil Matter, was published on 29 April 2002.7 That 
note was in turn replaced by the Current Practice Note, No 1 of 2007 
Guidelines for the Use of Technology in any Civil Litigation Matter, issued 
on 8 February 2007. 
 
The Federal Court of Australia published Practice Note 17 Guidelines for the 
Use of Technology in Litigation in any Civil Matter in April 2000. This Note 
remains current, but the Federal Court is in the process of preparing a 
“Judicial Toolkit” as a key component of its eTrial strategy. The Toolkit will 
include a replacement for the current Practice Note.8 
 
For South Australia Practice Direction No 52 Guidelines for the use of 
technology in litigation in any civil matter was issued on 17 August 2001. 
                                                 
6 Practice Note No 105 Use of Technology in Civil Litigation was replaced by 
Practice Note No 127 Use of Technology in Civil Litigation, with effect from 1 
March 2004. This was replaced by SC Gen 7 Supreme Court – Use of Technology, 
with effect from 17 August 2005. This was in turn replaced by Practice Note SC Gen 
7 which was published on 15 August 2006 and commenced on 1 September 2006. 
7 The review was conducted by the Victorian Society for Computers and the Law 
(headed by Sandra Potter and Phil Farrelly as co-chairs of the Society’s Practice and 
Procedures Focus Group) on behalf of the court: Sandra Potter and Peter Moon, 
“Supreme Court of Victoria Practice Note 1 of 2002- Guidelines for the use of 
technology in civil matters”, (2002) 49 NSW Society for Computers and the Law 
Journal, at:http://www.nswscl.org.au/journal/49/Potter_Moon.html, accessed 
10.8.07. 
8 The Hon MEJ Black AC, Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Australia, “New 
Technology Developments in the Courts: Usages, Trends and Recent Developments 
in Australia”, paper presented at the Seventh Worldwide Common Law Judiciary 
Conference, May 2007 at 17-18. 
          DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                             VOLUME 12 NO 1 84
The note was based on the generic draft practice note issued by the Australian 
Institute of Judicial Administration in 1999.9 This practice direction applied 
to civil litigation in all South Australian courts.10 Practice Direction 2.1 of 
Supreme Court Practice Directions 2006 (SA) Guidelines for the Use of 
Electronic Technology applies on and after 4 September 2006 and to actions 
which are governed by the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA). 
  
The Northern Territory issued Practice Direction No 2 of 200211 “Guidelines 
for the use of technology in any civil matter” on 13 February 2002. 
 
Queensland followed the lead of the other states, with the issue by the 
Supreme Court of Queensland on 13 July 2004 of Practice Direction No 8 of 
2004: Electronic Management of Documents.  
 
There are no relevant Practice Directions in Western Australia, Tasmania or 
the ACT.  
 
The detail of the various practice notes or directions varies, but those in the 
Federal Court, New South Wales, the Northern Territory, South Australia and 
Victoria are similar in many respects. They each encourage parties to use 
electronic data (or databases) to create lists of their discoverable documents, 
encourage parties to exchange electronic versions of documents such as 
pleadings and statements,12 and encourage parties to give discovery by 
exchanging databases created in accordance with an agreed protocol. They 
also encourage parties to consider the use of technology, including an 
electronic court book, at trial.  
                                                 
9 http://www.aija.org.au/info/techn/guideciv.htm 
10 The Practice Direction stood as Supreme Court Practice Direction 52, District 
Court Practice Direction No 10, and Magistrates Court Practice Direction No 1 of 
2001. 
11 The Practice Direction can be accessed at: 
http://www.nt.gov.au/ntsc/documents/20060106NT_SupremeCourt%20PracticeDirec
tions.pdf 
12 In the Federal Court, New South Wales and the Northern Territory, parties are 
required to accede to reasonable requests for copies of court documents in electronic 
format. The Victorian Note specifies (at 5.5) that “a party must, unless the Court 
otherwise orders, upon request deliver to any other party an additional copy in 
electronic format in accordance with the default standard of any court document 
which is required to be delivered in hard copy.” The Practice Direction in South 
Australia states (at 2.1.15) that when a party is required to serve a document in hard 
copy on another party, that party must, on the request of the receiving party, provide 
an electronic copy of that document.” 
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The Practice Direction in Queensland has many features that are clearly 
modelled on those applying elsewhere but it is certainly more conservative in 
its approach, and less demanding. Its stated aim is to “streamline the 
management of disclosed documents” by encouraging the adoption of 
document protocols from the institution of proceedings13, and encouraging 
the use of information technology to manage documents for disclosure and 
for interlocutory and directions hearings and at trial.  
 
The significant limitation that exists in relation to the current Australian 
Practice Notes and Directions in each of the jurisdictions other than Victoria 
is that they do not cover electronic discovery issues per se because they do 
not cater for the discovery of electronic documents in their native electronic 
format, such as email and their attachments, and electronic documents found 
on hard disks. There are a range of issues associated with sourcing documents 
in native electronic format, particularly those to be found on backup tapes.14 
Rather than deal with these issues, the notes tend to deal only with the 
conversion of hard copy documents to an electronic format ie the electronic 
information to which they refer generally relates to paper documents that 
have been scanned and the meta-data used to describe certain details about 
the document, for instance, document type (eg letter, contract etc), the 
document date and the document author. Parties are required to print 
electronic documents onto paper, scan the printed documents into a digitized 
format, index the scanned documents in a database system and exchange the 
scanned documents with supporting meta-data to the other litigants and the 
court.  
 
When electronic documents are to be included in discovery, it has been 
appropriately suggested that parties should discuss an electronic discovery 
plan and potential issues associated with electronic documents, including 
such issues as: whether any preservation measures are required, the media for 
production of electronic data and documents, the possibility of deleted data 
and the recovery of such data, the scope of email discovery, and the privilege 
that may attach to inadvertent production of electronic data.15  
 
                                                 
13 The Queensland Practice Direction relies heavily on form 19 (list of documents) of 
the forms under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), which effectively 
provides a “default” protocol “for use in all cases.” (The Practice Direction amended 
the previously existing version of the form to manage this). 
14 See BT Australasia Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [1998] FCA 363. 
15 A. Stanfield, E-Litigation, Thompson Legal and Regulatory Group, 2003 at 49-50. 
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The recent Practice Note in Victoria is the first in Australia to formally 
recognise the distinction between paper and electronic data and to attempt to 
address some of the associated issues. It provides “a court approved 
framework and default standard for managing both hard copy and electronic 
documents.”16 The Federal Court is also in the process of developing a new 
practice direction which deals with the disclosure of documents in their 
native electronic format17, although the proposed practice direction has not 
yet been released. 
 
Other countries have developed electronic discovery protocols that provide 
guidelines on discovering electronic information first-hand, in their native 
electronic formats. On 12 April 2006 amendments to the US Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were approved by the United States Supreme Court. The 
amendments took effect on 1 December 2006 and deal with “electronically 
stored information.”18 In Canada, the Supreme Court of British Columbia has 
created an Electronic Evidence Practice Direction19 and the Ontario Bar 
Association Discovery Task Force has issued eDiscovery Guidelines20 . The 
UK has developed a Draft Practice Direction - the Use of Technology in Civil 
                                                 
16 Practice Note No 1 of 2007, Guidelines for the Use of Technology in any Civil 
Litigation Matter, at 1.1. The Practice Note also provides (at 1.5) advice that further 
information to be found on the Supreme Court website includes guidance about the 
collection and management of electronic material in litigation. 
17 Above, n 8. 
18 The amendments affected rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45 and form 35. The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure can be accessed via the U.S. Courts website at: 
http.//www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules4.html. Instrumental to the development of 
these amendments was the Sedona Conference, a non-profit organisation of litigation 
practitioners in the USA, which produced a report entitled: “The Sedona Principles 
Addressing Electronic Document Production” (July 2005 Version) at: 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=7_05TSP.pdf, accessed 20.8.07. 
19 Supreme Court of British Columbia, Practice Direction Re Electronic Evidence, 
published 1.7.06. 
20 Ontario Bar Association, Discovery Task Force Sub-Committee, “Electronic 
Discovery Guidelines”, 2004. at http://www.oba.org/en/pdf_newsletter/E-
DiscoveryGuidelines.pdf , accessed 10.8.07. 
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Proceedings21, which provides very prescriptive examples of how to manage 
and exchange electronic documents.22  
 
 
III TECHNOLOGY AT TRIAL – CAN THE COURT DIRECT THE USE        
OF AN ELECTRONIC COURTROOM? 
 
In most of the matters that have been conducted with the use of technology at 
trial, the use of the technology has been by agreement between the parties. 
The decisions in Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [6]23 
(“Idoport”) and Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3)24 (“Harris Scarfe”) 
have made it clear that in appropriate cases and despite opposition by one or 
more of the parties the court will direct that technology be used at trial and 
make associated orders as necessary to facilitate the conduct of an electronic 
trial. 
 
 
A Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited – 
The Facts 
 
In Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [6]25 (“Idoport”) the 
proceedings involved complex claims by the plaintiffs extending to claims 
for billions of dollars against defendants including the National Australia 
Bank26. The defendants estimated the time required for the final hearing in 
the proceeding would be one year although it was accepted that it was 
impossible to give in any conclusive way an accurate estimate of the precise 
length of the hearing. There were approximately 8 weeks remaining before 
the hearing was to commence. 
                                                 
21 http://www.listgroup.org/documents/IT%20Practice%20Direction%20080705.doc 
, accessed 10.8.07. See also the Litigation Support Technology Group, UK, “Data 
Exchange Protocol Part 1 of 2 (Disclosure Documents) and Part 2 of 2 (Disclosure of 
Data), 27.4.2007 accessible on the Litigation Support Technology Group Website at 
http://www.listgroup.org/publications.htm.  
22 Sedona Conference Working Party, “The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practice 
Guidelines & Commentary for Managing Information & Records in the Electronic 
Age”, 2005, at: http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSG9_05.pdf  
23 [2000] NSWSC 338. 
24 [2005] SASC 407. 
25 [2000] NSWSC 338. 
26 The exact nature of the claims is summarised in the judgment on an interlocutory 
hearing delivered on 19 August 1999: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank 
Limited [1] [1999] NSWSC 828 at para 309 and following. 
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The proceedings involved very large numbers of documents. It was clear that 
in excess of 100,000 relevant pages of materials would arguably be referred 
to, relied upon or tendered for the defendant. The defendants had 
substantially imaged discovered documents but had not imaged documents 
relied upon or seen by experts, documents produced on subpoena, or 
documents discovered by the plaintiffs and which the defendants may decide 
to tender. From the plaintiffs’ side of the record, it appeared the trial may 
have to cope with 20,000 to 25,000 pages. 
 
The primary question for determination by the court was the extent to which 
technology should be used for the hearing of the proceedings. The defendants 
did not wish to use the Technology Court. Although in principle embracing 
the use of technology where appropriate to assist the parties and the Court to 
dispose of the proceedings as quickly and efficiently as possible, it was their 
submission that the use of that court would not be efficient for the particular 
proceedings at hand. The plaintiffs on the other hand sought to use the 
Technology Court. They submitted that this use would be an efficient way of 
seeking to get through the hearing in a practicable way with the minimum of 
time, consistent with the obvious requirement that all parties be permitted to 
take time and care with which to present their respective cases.  
 
The decision of Einstein J involved detailed analysis of the basis of the 
court’s jurisdiction to direct the use of the Technology Court and discussion 
of the manner in which the trial might proceed if conducted in that court. 
 
 
 B Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) – The Facts 
 
In Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3)27 (“Harris Scarfe”) the action 
involved claims for damages by various companies in the Harris Scarfe 
group, which was in liquidation, and by the ANZ Bank which was the major 
lender to the Harris Scarfe group. The proceedings were brought against three 
firms of chartered accountants who, at various times, were auditors of 
companies in the Harris Scarfe group. It was alleged that over relevant 
periods the defendants had prepared half-yearly reports and reviews 
negligently, in breach of a contractual duty of care, and in circumstances 
amounting to misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of s 56 of the Fair 
Trading Act 1987 (SA).  
 
                                                 
27 [2005] SASC 407. 
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It was alleged in particular that the defendants had failed to detect that senior 
management of the Harris Scarfe group had fraudulently manipulated the 
accounts so as to show substantial operating profits, whereas in reality 
throughout the relevant period the group has sustained significant losses. The 
action was being managed in accordance with the provisions of r 2A of the 
Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) as a complex action. The plaintiffs’ 
statement of claim had appeared to be settled and orders had been made 
requiring the defendants to file amended defences by the middle of 
November 2005. 
 
It was estimated the trial would occupy at least six months, although it could 
be substantially more. The plaintiffs were represented by common solicitors 
and counsel, with the three defendants being represented by two sets of 
counsel. 
 
The plaintiffs submitted that the case was one in which the use of an 
electronic court was appropriate and would have numerous advantages. The 
first defendant supported the use of technology for the trial and the pre-trial 
preparations. The second and third defendants raised a number of specific 
objections and issues for the consideration of the court, namely: 
 
• did the court have the power to direct, without agreement, the use 
of an electronic courtroom?; 
• was it too early to make a decision as to the potential utility of an 
electronic courtroom because the proceedings were not 
sufficiently advanced? 
• to what extent should technology be used? 
• what were the costs implications, and who should bear the 
expense associated with the establishment and use of an 
electronic court, particularly if required by court order? 
 
 
 C Jurisdiction for Orders as to Use of Technology 
 
The recent practice notes in Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia 
authorise the court to direct the use of technology at trial28. However, even in 
                                                 
 28 Practice Note No 1 of 2007, Guidelines for the Use of Technology in any Civil 
Litigation Matter (Vic) specifically authorises the Court to make a range of orders, 
including (at 2.8.6) that there be an electronic trial of the proceeding. It also specifies 
(at 2.9) a range of orders which may be included in the order for the electronic trial 
of the proceeding. Practice Note No SC Gen 7 Supreme Court – Use of Technology 
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the absence of a specific authority of this kind in a practice direction or note, 
there are two potential sources of jurisdiction for the making of such orders: 
the rules of court, and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
 
1 Rules of Court – Power to Give Directions 
 
In Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3)29 Bleby J was satisfied that the rules 
of court gave him the specific power to make orders for the use of technology 
at trial. He referred in particular to r 55.11 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 
(SA). That rule is a clear source of jurisdiction for the court to direct the 
parties to use technology in the litigation process and at trial. It provides that 
the Court may give such directions as are proper with respect to: 
 
(y) the use of any litigation support system or any other computer process 
considered appropriate by the court. 
 
Though only a few jurisdictions include a specific power to make directions 
involving the use of technology30 the rules of court in most jurisdictions also 
                                                                                                                    
(NSW) specifies as one of the purposes of the Practice Note that it is to “emphasise 
the court’s power to require the use of technology in particular cases or 
circumstances” (para 4). The current New South Wales Practice Note also states that 
the court retains the power to direct parties to use information technology in 
appropriate cases (para 10). There was not such an express power under Practice 
Note No 105 Use of Technology in Civil Litigation, published in March 1999, which 
was the relevant Practice Note at the time of the decision in Idoport Pty Ltd v 
National Australia Bank Limited [6] [2000] NSWCA 338. Practice Direction 2.1 of 
Supreme Court Practice Directions 2006 (SA) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic 
Technology, which applies on and after 4 September 2006 and to actions which are 
governed by the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) now also authorises the 
making of a range of orders, including (in relation to the use of technology at the 
hearing) a direction that the parties confer with, or engage, an electronic service 
provider: see 2.1.23. There was no similar express authority under Direction No 52 
Guidelines for the use of technology in litigation in any civil matter (SA), which was 
issued on 17 August 2001 and was the relevant Practice Direction at the time of the 
decision in Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407.  
29 [2005] SASC 407. 
30 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 2.3 authorises the court to give 
directions and make orders relating to “…the use of telephone or video conferencing 
facilities, videotapes, film projection, computer and other equipment and 
technology.” There is also a specific power in the Rules of Supreme Court 1971 
(WA) in relation to interlocutory proceedings: O 29A r3(2) provides that a case 
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provide a general power to give directions about the conduct of a matter.31 In 
Queensland, for example, r 367(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
1999 (Qld) provides: 
 
(1) The court may make any other order or direction about the conduct of 
a proceeding it considers appropriate, even though the order or direction 
may be inconsistent with another provision of these rules. 
  
This rule provides the court with a wide discretion and is sufficiently broad to 
extend to a direction requiring the adoption of technology in the litigation 
process. This construction is consistent with the view expressed by Bleby J in 
Harris Scarfe. Although his Honour found the specific power in the South 
Australian Rules of Court to make the orders sought, he also found the power 
to be conferred by r 3.04, which is the South Australian equivalent to r 367(1) 
of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) and gives the court a 
general power to give directions about the conduct of a matter.32 
 
An argument was made for the second and third defendants in Harris Scarfe 
to the effect that r 78.01(2) of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) restricts 
the Court’s ability to make the orders sought. That rule enables the Court to 
order that evidence of any particular fact shall be given at the trial in such 
manner as may be specified in the order. It enables, for example, directions to 
be given that the evidence-in-chief of certain witnesses be given by written 
statement. Bleby J rejected the argument. He said33: 
 
It does not restrict in any way directions for the use of technology in 
the production of such statements or other evidence. Rather, it is 
another example of the wide discretion conferred on the Court to 
                                                                                                                    
management direction may give directions as to the use of videotapes, films, 
computers and other equipment in any interlocutory proceeding. 
31 See Federal Court Rules 1979 O 10 r 1(1); Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) 
r1401(1); Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 2.1; Supreme Court Rules 
2000 (Tas) rr 415, 425, 550; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 367(1); 
Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 3.04, Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) rr 116, 
117; Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 1998 (Vic) rr 2.04, 
3.04, 8.05.  
32 Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r3.04 provides that the court has power, in any 
case in which it thinks it just to do so to …(g) Do all or any acts or give any 
directions relating to the conduct of an action subject to such terms as to costs or 
otherwise as it thinks proper. (See now Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) rr 116, 
117.) 
33 [2005] SASC 407 at [16]. 
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direct the giving of evidence in a manner that is efficient and 
appropriate. [emphasis added] 
 
 
2 Rules of Court – Overriding Objective 
 
In his judgment in Idoport34 Einstein J did not base his judgment on the 
court’s power under the rules of court to make directions. He referred, 
however, to Supreme Court Rules (Amendment No 337) 2000 (NSW) which 
inserted a new Part 1 Rule 3 into the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW). The 
new rule provided in particular:  
 
3(1) The overriding purpose of these rules, in their application to 
civil proceedings, is to facilitate the just and cheap resolution of the 
real issues in such proceedings. 
(2) The court must seek to give effect to the overriding purpose when 
it exercises any power given to it by the rules or when interpreting 
any rule. 
(3) A party to civil proceedings is under a duty to assist the court to 
further the overriding purpose and, to that effect, to participate in the 
processes of the Court and to comply with directions and orders of 
the Court. 
…35 
 
The equivalent rule is now found in s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 
(NSW) which sets out the same purpose as applying to that Act and to the 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).  
In this context the New South Wales rules adopt the statement of overriding 
purpose as incorporated into the Woolf Reforms introduced in England by 
the Civil Procedure Rules.36 Those rules were introduced in 1999, and 
replaced many of the provisions of the old Rules of the Supreme Court and 
                                                 
34 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [2000] NSWSC 338. 
35 The rule was repealed by in 2005 by amendment no 407, Sch 1 [5]. 
36 Rule 1.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules expresses the “overriding objective” to 
enable the court “to deal with cases justly”. The court has an obligation to give effect 
to the overriding objectives in exercising any power given to it under the rules and 
when interpreting their implementation. The overriding objective encompasses five 
principles which are given effect to in Rule 1.1(2)(a) - (e). For Lord Woolf’s 
elucidation of those principles see: Lord Woolf: “The Future of Civil Justice” (1997) 
3 The Judicial Review pp 103-107. 
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County Court rules. They govern the practice and procedure to be followed in 
the civil division of the Court of Appeal, the High Court, and county courts. 
When delivering his judgment in Idoport37 Einstein J observed that no 
Australian cases had by that time considered the “overriding purpose” 
clause38. Einstein J did, however, refer to a number of recent English cases 
which had considered the operation of the “overrriding objective” as 
providing a possibly valuable source of persuasive authority, although he 
noted as a point of distinction that the Woolf reforms included, but were 
more extensive than, the insertion of an overriding purpose clause.39 His 
Honour also referred to a number of academic writings in relation to the 
overriding objective clause.40 Though all of the cases and writings referred to 
addressed some aspects of the overriding objective clause none dealt 
specifically with the interrelationship between the overriding purpose and the 
role that may be played by technology in the litigation process. 
As Sandy has observed,41 the existence of the overriding principle provides 
the court with significant discretionary powers to ameliorate the rigour of the 
rules of court, but it also makes the judicial process less certain and 
subjective and one judge’s perspective on what constitutes the interests of 
justice may be radically different from his or her judicial companions. 
Whether it is in the interests of justice to use technology in the litigation 
process and at trial is certainly an issue upon which different judges may 
have different views, depending upon their own expertise and experiences. It 
is clear that, however, that Einstein J was of the view that the giving of an 
                                                 
37 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [2000] NSWSC 338 at [19]. 
This judgment was delivered on 14 April 2000. 
38 This observation was arguably inaccurate: certainly the Queensland Court of 
Appeal had considered the equivalent Queensland rule in Thomas v NAB Ltd [1999] 
QCA 525, as discussed below. 
39 Shikari v Malik [1000] TLR 391; Christofi v Barclays Bank Plc [1999] TLR 487; 
Cowland & Kendrick v Judges of the West London County Court (unreported, Court 
of Appeal (Civil Division), 20 July 1999; Stephenson (SBJ) Ltd v Mandy [1999] TLR 
550; Mullan v Birmingham City Council [1999] TLR 573; MacDonald v Thorn Plc 
[1999] TLR 691; Biguzzi v Rank Leisure Plc [1999] 1 WLR 1926. 
40 Richard Harrison, “Will Woolf Change the Way We Behave?” (1998) 148 New 
Law Journal at 1853-1854, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, “The UK Access to Justice 
Report: A Sheep in Woolf’s Clothing” (1999) 28 The University of Western Australia 
Law Review pp183-186, Gordon Exall, “Civil Litigation Brief: Woolf Reforms (3)” 
(1999) 143 Solicitors Journal, p112; David Sandy, “Dealing Justly” at 
www.simmons-simmons.com/woolf/dealing.htm.  
41 Sandy, above n 40. 
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order requiring the use of technology, including its use at the trial of the 
proceeding, could be necessary in order to achieve the overriding objective.  
 
In Harris Scarfe42 Bleby J noted that the particular rules of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales in relation to the overriding purpose of the rules 
of court, as referred to by Einstein J in Idoport, have their equivalents in 
South Australia in r 2.0143, which provides: 
 
 
These rules are made for the purpose of establishing orderly 
procedures for the conduct of litigation in the Court and of promoting 
the just and efficient determination of such litigation. They are not 
intended to defeat a proper claim or defence of a litigant who is 
genuinely endeavouring to comply with the procedures of the court, 
and are to be interpreted and applied with the above purpose in view. 
 
 
In the light of this rule his Honour was satisfied that the considerations 
Einstein J referred to in Idoport also applied to actions in the Supreme Court 
of South Australia, and it is apparent from his judgment also that his Honour 
was satisfied that it could well be necessary in the interests of justice to order 
the use of technology at the trial of a proceeding. 
 
The Rules of Court in several other jurisdictions now include an express 
requirement that the rules of court be construed and applied so as to achieve 
objectives which include the promotion of justice and efficiency in the 
litigation process.44 The relevant rule in Queensland is r 5 of the Uniform 
Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). This rule sets out the “philosophy” of the 
rules in terms of the overriding obligations of the parties and the court. It 
states: 
 
5. (1) The purpose of these rules is to facilitate the just and expeditious 
resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings at a minimum of 
expense. 
(2) Accordingly, these rules are to be applied by the courts with the 
objective of avoiding undue delay, expense and technicality and 
facilitating the purpose of these rules. 
                                                 
42 [2005] SASC 407. 
43 See now Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 3. 
44 Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r 21; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 
(Qld) r 5; Rules of Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 1 r 4(B). 
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(3) In a proceeding in a court, a party impliedly undertakes to the court 
and to the other parties to proceed in an expeditious way. 
(4) The court may impose appropriate sanctions if a party does not 
comply with these rules or an order of the court. 
 
Rule 5-(1) & (2) were interpreted and applied by Pincus J in Thomas v NAB 
Ltd
45:  
 
“The proper interpretation of this rule appears to be that, when faced 
with an established practice which can lead to 'undue delay, expense 
and technicality', the Court should attempt to avoid these results.” 
[emphasis added] 
 
 
It is submitted that if the conduct of a traditional paper-based trial would 
clearly be far more time-consuming and costly than its conduct in an 
electronic court it is at the least arguable that the parties would be in breach 
of their implied undertaking to the court in rule 5(3) to decline to use the 
electronic court. Further, consistent with the views of Pincus J in Thomas the 
court should attempt “to avoid the result” which would follow from the 
adoption of “established practice.” One way it may do this is to exercise its 
power to give directions about to the conduct of a matter46 to direct that the 
trial proceed in an electronic court. 
 
 
3 Inherent Jurisdiction 
 
Although satisfied that the rules to which they had referred, particularly when 
interpreted in the light of the overriding purpose of the rules, were sufficient 
foundation for the making of the orders proposed, both Einstein J in Idoport47 
and Bleby J in Harris Scarfe48 were satisfied that the court also had inherent 
jurisdiction to make the orders sought.  
 
                                                 
45 [1999] QCA 525 at [35]. 
46 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 367(1). See also Federal Court Rules 
1979 r 10.1(2); Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r1401; Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules 2005 (NSW) r 2.1; Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) rr 415, 425, 550; Supreme 
Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 1998 (Vic) rr 2.04, 3.04, 8.05.  
47 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [2000] NSWSC 338. 
48 Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407. 
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In Idoport Einstein J had referred to a range of decisions on the court’s 
inherent jurisdiction to exercise powers necessary to enable it to act 
effectively within its jurisdiction49 including an untrammelled power of 
regulating its own proceedings.50 He noted the purpose of the implied 
jurisdiction was to allow the Court to make such orders as to enable it to 
uphold, protect and fulfil the judicial function by ensuring that justice is 
administered according to law and in an effective manner51 and that it was 
proper to exercise the power not only where it was necessary to do so, but 
also to secure or promote convenience, expedition and efficiency in the 
administration of justice.52 His Honour also referred to the articulation in the 
rules of the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases 
justly, as discussed above, and proceeded:53 
 
 
Hence the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to regulate its 
own proceedings so as to promote matters relating to convenience, 
expedition and efficiency in the administration of justice, includes 
directing or ordering the parties to use certain procedures, if the 
benefits derived from the use of such procedures justifies the costs 
and will ensure that the trial proceeds quickly and efficiently. 
[emphasis added] 
 
 
In Harris Scarfe54 Bleby J adopted the views of Einstein J in Idoport55 in 
relation to the inherent jurisdiction. His Honour noted in that context that for 
South Australia the inherent jurisdiction of the court to make the orders 
sought was specifically preserved by the Rules of Court.56 
 
                                                 
49 Connolly v Director of Prosecutions [1964] AC 1244 at 1301 per Lord Devlin. 
50 Abse v Smith [1986] 1 QB 536 at 555 per May LJ. 
51 John Fairfax and Sons v Police Tribunal (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 at 476 per 
McHugh JA. 
52 O’Toole v Scott [1965] AC 939 at 959 per Lord Pearson. 
53 [2000] NSWSC 338 at [15]. 
54 [2005] SASC 407 at [13]. 
55 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [2000] NSWSC 338 esp at [10]-
[15]. 
56 Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 3.06 provides: The provisions of these rules are 
in addition to, and shall not derogate from, any inherent jurisdiction of the court. See 
now: Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r6(3). The rules of court in Western 
Australia also expressly reserve the inherent power of the court to control the conduct 
of a proceeding: Rules of Supreme Court 1979 (WA) O 1 r 3A.  
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4 Interests of Justice 
 
The common theme that emerges from the analysis of any of the potential 
sources of jurisdiction for the court to order the use of technology in the 
litigation process or at trial, whether in the exercise of its power under the 
rules to make directions relating to the conduct of a matter, in reliance upon 
provisions as to the “overriding purpose” or the “philosophy” of the rules, is 
that the court must be satisfied that the use of technology will assist to ensure 
that the action proceeds quickly and efficiently. It will in that event be in the 
interests of justice to make such orders.  
 
 
IV WHEN DO THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE CALL FOR THE USE OF 
TECHNOLOGY IN LITIGATION? 
 
It is interesting to note that in Idoport57 the basis for the defendants’ 
resistance to the use of the technology court at trial was not a fundamental 
opposition to the use of technology in the litigation process. Indeed, in 
principle the defendants embraced the concept of the use of technology where 
appropriate to assist the parties and the courts to dispose of the proceedings 
as quickly as possible. Their submission, however, was that at the end of the 
day, for various reasons, the use of that court would not be efficient in 
relation to the proceedings at hand.58 
 
For the plaintiffs it was contended that the Technology Court should be used 
because that would be an efficient manner of seeking to get through the 
hearing in a practicable way in the minimum of time, consistent with the 
obvious requirements that all parties should be permitted to take time and 
care in the presentation of their respective cases.59 
 
To come to some conclusions about whether and when the court may 
determine that the interests of justice will be furthered by the use of 
technology either in the litigation process or at trial, it is necessary to 
examine the advantages that the use of technology may offer over 
conventional procedures for both trial preparation and trial, with a view to 
clarifying the circumstances in which it may be found that “the benefits 
                                                 
57 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [2000] NSWSC 338. 
58 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [2000] NSWSC 338 at [5]. 
59 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [2000] NSWSC 338 at [6]. 
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derived from the use of such procedures justifies the costs and will ensure 
that the trial proceeds quickly and efficiently.”60 
 
 
 A Pre-Trial 
 
1 Document Management Systems – Key Features 
 
While the conduct of an electronic trial may be the desirable outcome for 
large scale litigation, the first step in the process, namely the adoption of a 
quality document management system, of itself provides a range of benefits.61 
 
It is possible to have a suitable database custom-built. As time has gone by an 
increasing number of larger law firms developed their own in-house software 
to manage litigation documents, usually through a customised Microsoft 
Access database. 
 
There are also now several commercial providers in Australia providing a 
range of quality litigation support systems.62 For law firms which do not want 
to invest in information technology capital, particularly if the technology 
might only be required for a single case, there is now also an option of 
renting access to the required technology. The requisite software is available 
in an environment independent of the firm’s own network and can be 
securely accessed across the internet. 
 
Entrepreneurs have also seen the potential for businesses which could 
provide document management expertise to law firms in a cost-effective way 
to provide it commercially and now many litigation practitioners, most often 
the small and medium firms, outsource their document processing to a 
litigation support bureau. 
 
                                                 
60 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [2000] NSWSC 338 at [15]. 
61 See: S Drummond, “The limits of discovery”, Lawyers Weekly, 27 May 2005. For 
discussion of the advances in technology for disclosure and litigation support in the 
US, see Robert Hart, “Getting over the paper chase” (2000) 22(4) Ohio Lawyers 
Weekly.  
62 For discussion of the various features of leading litigation support products on the 
Australian market see Deborah Coram and Adam Seskis, “Litigation Support 
Systems”, Lawyers Weekly, 31 May 2002 14. See also Sandra Potter and Peter Moon, 
“Guidelines for the use of technology in civil matters” (1999) 73(9) Law Institute 
Journal 62 at 63-64 for discussion of the then available technologies and their 
respective advantages and disadvantages. 
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To obtain the benefits available through the adoption of technology pre-trial 
the documents need to be put into the database. Databases have two essential 
parts: the documents themselves, and the descriptive information about the 
documents, attached to the documents. 
 
If the documents have not been produced electronically, or if they are 
documents such as letters, plans, invoices etc, that have been produced by 
others and are not available to a party in electronic form, then they must be 
scanned and an electronic copy stored. 
 
Once an electronic copy of the documents has been stored, information about 
that document needs to be put into the database. The various practice 
directions that have been outlined assist in suggesting the appropriate 
information to include. Some of it is quite obvious and is the sort of 
information that has always been included in the list of documents for 
discovery or disclosure, such as the date and the author of the document. 
 
Though not essential for documents stored only in a paper environment, an 
essential piece of information for each document to be included in an 
electronic database is the document identification number. Each page of each 
document must be identified with a unique barcode. This only needs to be 
done once, before the documents are processed. This document identification 
must be done in a logical and consistent way. Accuracy in allocation and 
entry of this information is extremely important because this is the means by 
which the database is effectively able to identify any particular document 
amongst the hundreds or thousands of documents. If incorrect information is 
put into the database then it is unlikely to work accurately. 
 
An increasing proportion of all documents are produced electronically.63 
Although it is usually quite a simple process to add these to the database the 
completion of the descriptive information about the documents can at present 
be time-consuming and costly. Although emails will necessarily capture the 
necessary meta data there are many electronic documents, including email 
attachments, for which the necessary meta data is either not captured, or not 
captured in a meaningful way. Work is being undertaken towards the 
                                                 
63 See S Potter and P Farrelly, “Managing e-files in discovery in civil litigation 
matters” (2003) 77(7) Law Institute Journal 38. The authors refer to research by the 
Gartner Group which shows that 80% of data created in the last 20 years exists in 
electronic form, and that 97.3% of all documents created in 2003 were electronic. 
The article also discusses some of the practical issues that may arise in relation to 
discovery of electronic data. 
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development of standards for legal documents and applications and this will 
assist to address the issues and reduce the costs currently involved in dealing 
with documents produced in electronic form.64  
 
 
2 Document Management Systems – the Benefits 
 
Once the documents and the requisite information about them are in a 
database a number of facilities are available that are not on offer in a paper-
based environment. 
 
• Processing 
 
It is only necessary to scan documents once, and they can then be used in 
a number of contexts, such as for exchanging of electronic copies of 
documents with other parties, preparing electronic court books and 
preparing electronic appeal books. The database can store not only 
material disclosed by a party or obtained through disclosure, but also 
other documents such as file notes, counsel advices etc. 
 
• Sort, search, locate 
 
Documents can be grouped in any desired way and located quickly. 
Lawyers are able to assign documents to particular issues in a case. As an 
example, a party may wish to view all of the documents relevant to a 
particular issue, or all of the documents dated between particular dates, 
and these documents can be immediately identified and quickly located. 
With paper documents it would take someone considerable time to locate 
and retrieve these documents, even if they had been indexed in electronic 
form. 
 
In a similar way it may be that in the course of trial preparation, or during 
trial, a specific document assumes some particular importance. The 
database can be searched to find quickly any other documents in which 
the document of interest was mentioned. 
 
 
                                                 
64 For more detailed consideration of the issues involved in the discovery of 
documents produced in electronic form and suggestions as to how these issues are 
likely to be addressed in the future, see A. Stanfield, E-Litigation, Thompson Legal 
and Regulatory Group, 2003 at 55-56. 
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• Space-saving, portable 
 
Digital storing of documents greatly reduces physical storage space 
required. There is no need to rely on hard copies of any document and 
therefore no need to carry folders of documents between offices or to 
court. Hard copies of documents can be reproduced at any time, if 
required. 
 
• Collaboration, notation 
 
The client, solicitor and counsel can all be in different locations but go 
on-line and access the documents from anywhere. Notes may be made by 
one person on a particular document and these can be viewed by the 
other members of the litigation team when they open the document. This 
enables collaboration even though those involved are at different physical 
locations and are accessing the documents at different times. 
 
• Electronic trial 
 
The adoption of a quality electronic document management system at the 
pre-trial stage facilitates the use of technology at the trial in the 
proceeding. The benefits technology may then bring to the trial are 
discussed further below. 
 
The use of an electronic document management system enables litigation 
practitioners to access all of their client’s documents at the touch of a 
keystroke from their computers, or from any other computer connected to the 
internet. Disclosure can be undertaken by simply handing over a CD-Rom 
instead of mounds of hard copy documents. 
 
It is obvious, however, that the benefits are greater the more documents are 
involved as it means thousands of documents can be accessed, searched, 
sorted, etc as simply as hundreds. 
 
 
 B Trial 
 
As has been mentioned, there is no clear definition of an “electronic court.” 
Although the conduct of a trial electronically may include the use of a wide 
range of possible features, the following is a useful list of basic features 
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suggested by Stanfield as necessary for the effective working of an e-
courtroom65: 
• Collection of documents in a consistent electronic format 
• Adequate preparation using the electronic tools  
• The courtroom itself 
• Hardware 
• Electronic court Book 
• Transcription management 
• Visual display system 
• Court operator 
• Appropriate expertise to support the system 
• Adequate training and preparation for using the electronic tools 
 
It may also be noted that the New South Wales Practice Notice refers to some 
of the commonly used equipment and services that parties may seek to have 
available in the courtroom or jury deliberation room during the hearing, 
including real time transcript, video-conferencing, and computers at the bar 
table.66  
 
The benefits which may be brought to a trial through the use of technology 
were discussed by both Bleby J in Harris Scarfe67 and Einstein J in Idoport68. 
They include the ability for parties to conduct a trial to a large extent in a 
“paperless” manner. Relevant documents on the court file, such as pleadings, 
particulars, document lists and affidavits are stored and can be retrieved as 
required. Other documents such as witness statements, expert reports, 
chronologies, lists of documents and outlines of argument can also be 
presented electronically. The database also incorporates documents which 
will be, or are likely to be, tendered at the trial. The electronic version of the 
transcript will also be included and there is an option to incorporate real time 
transcript of the proceedings. If that option is taken it is also possible at the 
end of each day to email transcript to media outlets that may have requested 
it.  
 
Secure and efficient access to all of the documents described is available to 
the trial judge, the court staff and the parties, and in the courtroom and 
                                                 
65 A. Stanfield, E-Litigation, Thompson Legal and Regulatory Group, 2003 at 71. 
66 Practice Note SC Gen 7 Supreme Court – Use of Technology, published 15.8.06. 
67 Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407 at [17] –[22]. 
68 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited [2000] NSWSC 338 at [42]-
[78]. See also the description of the “electronic” courtroom used in Seven Network 
Limited v News Limited (No 9) [2005] FCA 1394 at [4]-[5]. 
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elsewhere. This means that people involved in the trial are able to work more 
efficiently given that materials will be available remotely after hours, and the 
movement and physical accommodation of the materials will not be 
necessary. If the necessary computers are available in court for the duration 
of the trial it also means there is no need for parties to carry equipment such 
as lap top computers to court, or for judges to move such equipment between 
chambers and the court room.  
 
During the trial documents, and if necessary more than one document at a 
time, may displayed to persons in the courtroom on monitors with plasma 
screens set up for this purpose. In the courtroom itself, counsel, solicitors, the 
witness, the judge and the judge’s associate each have such facilities 
available. There is also the facility for users to “freeze” a document they wish 
to keep in front of them, and to move between related documents and 
transcript by way of hyperlinks.  
 
Exhibits and documents for identification can be marked appropriately, with 
exhibit markings including information about the basis of tender, any 
qualifications on tender and admission, and transcript references at the point 
of tender. Subsequent references by witnesses and counsel to the exhibit can 
also be incorporated.  
 
Users have the ability to create documents, or to annotate documents and 
transcript, for private use and access or for access by a restricted group, such 
as counsel and solicitors for one party only. Documents which would 
ordinarily be publicly available on a hard copy court file, including 
evidentiary material once it is before the court69, can be separated out from 
the other documents to which access must be restricted. Masking of parts of 
documents can be easily accommodated. This means there is no difficulty in 
protecting confidentiality of commercially sensitive documents or parts of 
documents.  
 
Other available features include contact information, calendar and messaging 
capabilities and an interface with the internet providing immediate access to 
most relevant case law and legislation.  
 
The ability to sort and index documents, which provides enormous benefits 
pre-trial, is also useful during the course of the trial, as are the powerful 
search facilities that enable quick and easy reference to documents and 
                                                 
69 In Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 9) [2005] FCA 1394 the Federal Court 
referred to such documents as a “media courtbook”. 
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relevant transcript across the system. The quick access to documents in court 
promotes efficient use of court time. The ability to search, in particular, saves 
many hours of work from the point of view of counsel, the judge and the 
judge’s staff. 
 
Certainly the use of a quality document management system means that 
counsel can access any document he or she wants quickly and efficiently. 
There is no need to hunt through folders of hard copy documents, or to try to 
remember which folder particular documents are in, or in larger litigation, 
which trolley they are on. Exhibits and real time transcript can be added to 
the database during trial and can be noted and cross-referenced as required. 
 
For optimal use of the features of an electronic court the systems which the 
parties have adopted at the pre-trial stage need to be made compatible with 
the system set up for the electronic trial. 
 
A range of other features may be included in a set up for an electronic trial70. 
The system used for the enquiry into the Glenbrook Railway disaster allowed 
the addition of audio evidence (involving recordings from signal operators 
and train drivers) in digital formal, accessible through the database.71 Another 
well-publicised trial that proceeded in an electronic court was the Bell Group 
case: the longest running civil trial in the history of Western Australia and 
Australia’s biggest corporate recovery claim72. The trial in that case, for 
example, also made extensive use of video-conferencing facilities which 
were used to bring witnesses into the courtroom from anywhere in the world 
as though they were addressing the court73.  
                                                 
70 For discussion of a range of innovative uses of technology in litigation see the 
Victorian Law Reform Committee, Technology and the Law 1999, Final Report, at 
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/lawreform/tech/, esp at ch 10. This chapter also 
includes detailed explanation of the features of the special courtroom set up for the 
Estate Mortgage Litigation (See 10.11-10.16). 
71 Jeff Leeuwenberg and Anne Wallace, Technology for Justice 2000, AIJA (2001), 
9. 
72
 The case involved a $1.4 billion recovery claim by the former Western Australia 
Government Insurance Commission against a consortium of 20 banks used by the 
former Alan Bond company, the Bell Group Limited. 
73 See: S Tarling, “E-trial ushers in judgment day for IT”, The Age, 23.9.2003 at: 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/09/22/1064082/2340.html, accessed 25.1.06. 
This article includes an outline of the features available in the court established for 
that trial. See also J Leeuwenberg and A Wallace, Technology for Justice 2002 
Report, The Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Inc, at: 
http://www.aija.org.au/tech3/.report.pdf, accessed 3.1.06, at 4. The authors there note 
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Following his consideration of the features possibly available at trial through 
the use of technology Bleby J in Harris Scarfe74 concluded that the 
advantages of an electronic court were “numerous and manifestly obvious.” 
Significantly, however, he qualified this by reference to “a long and complex 
matter such as the one at hand”.  
 
In a case such as the one before him Bleby J thought the reduction in trial 
time would be likely to be substantial. His Honour indicated that a 
conservative estimate as to the length of trial in the matter before him was six 
months, and that it could well take longer. He noted in that regard that it 
would be necessary to call many witnesses, and that a large number of 
documents would be tendered. The collective costs of each day that the trial 
continued, including costs of senior counsel and at least one firm of principal 
instructing solicitors from interstate, would be substantial. Accordingly, in 
his Honour’s view, even a minor reduction in the length of trial would deliver 
substantial cost savings. 
 
 
 C Threshold Number of Documents? 
 
The cases that have been conducted in an electronic court have in most 
instances been highly publicised and long-running trials, such as the Bell 
Group case, the Estate Mortgage case and the Longford Royal Commission 
in Victoria, the trial in Queensland in Emanuel Management Pty Ltd (in liq) v 
Foster’s Brewing Group
75, and the recent proceeding in the Federal Court 
brought by Seven Network Limited, alleging breaches of the provisions of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in the bidding for television rights to 
Australian Football League and National Rugby League games.76 
 
A time and cost comparison of tasks that need to be performed in a manual 
environment compared with those performed in an automated environment 
will undoubtedly indicate a saving when large volumes of documents are 
involved. A sample provided by Deborah Coram and Adam Seskis in their 
                                                                                                                    
that one of the issues the courts will have to grapple with is the way in which the 
delivery of justice can or should take place in “virtual reality” as opposed to the 
physical environment of a courtroom. 
74 Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407 at [19]. 
75 [2003] QSC 299. 
76 Seven Network Limited v News Limited [2007] FCA 1062. For an outline of the 
dimensions of the hearing of this litigation see “1.2 The Hearing” at [6]-[9]. 
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article “Litigation Support Systems”77 suggests that the total cost and time 
expended in managing a matter with a litigation support system almost halves 
the cost and time spent without the use of such a system. But this study is 
based on 20 folders of documents comprising 7000 pages and 2,300 
documents. 
 
In a similar vein, and although clearly supporting the adoption of technology 
in the case at hand as delivering a range of benefits, the judgment of Bleby J 
in Harris Scarfe78 makes it clear that this was because the matter was “long 
and complex”. There is undoubtedly significant expense involved in 
establishing and running an electronic court. The wiring of the court used for 
the trial in the Bell Group case, for example, was estimated at some 
$860,00079 and this expense would not be justified in the simplest of 
litigation matters involving only a very small number documents.  
 
Developments in hardware over recent years, however, have meant that the 
use of technology may be cost-effective in a wider range of cases80, and also 
mean that parties and the courts may be able to use only that part of the 
available technology that suits the particular case, rather than necessarily 
adopting a whole system. In Harris Scarfe81 Bleby J acknowledged the 
significant expenses involved in establishing an electronic court, but found 
them to be insignificant when viewed against the costs which would 
necessarily be incurred in taking the matter before him to trial and also 
against the amount of damages being sought. His Honour commented, 
however82:  
 
Much shorter trials than the one presently contemplated have been 
seen in other jurisdictions to warrant the use of this type of 
courtroom technology in the interests of efficiency. 
                                                 
77 Above n 62, 15. 
78 Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407 at [19]. 
79 Tarling, above n 73. 
80 Jeff Leeuwenberg and Anne Wallace, Technology for Justice 2000, AIJA (2001), 
10. The authors refer in particular to the development of large format flat screen 
monitors that are better suited for courtroom use; improvements in the size, 
reliability, capacity and price or personal computers. They note it is relatively easy to 
put together a basic courtroom display kit, suitable for semi-portable use and quick to 
set up, using a laptop, 4-5 screens, CD-ROM burner, a document camera, scanners 
and basic cabling. 
81 Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407. 
82 Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407 at [22]. 
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Unfortunately, this comment was not supported by reference to particular 
cases, nor does it explain further the circumstances in which it will be 
efficient for “much shorter trials” to be conducted in an electronic court. 
However in this case, as in the other cases that have been discussed, little is 
said to provide guidance as to the point at which the benefits of the adoption 
of technology will outweigh the costs.  
 
Examples certainly can be found of shorter trials that have been conducted 
electronically. One example is the challenge by Visa International and 
Mastercard to the Reserve Bank’s decision to bring the credit card schemes 
under its regulatory control.83 In providing a summary of the principle issues 
and some of his principle reasons for judgment in the matter (before 
publishing his full reasons for judgment) Tamberlin J said: 
 
Due to the use of advanced courtroom technology…the hearing was 
reduced to the relatively short period of six weeks. Without this 
assistance from the technology and cooperation of the litigants, the 
hearing could have extended over many months. 
 
In most of the jurisdictions that have adopted a practice note or direction 
about the use of technology, as discussed above, a threshold number of 
documents likely to be discoverable has been stipulated as triggering the 
court’s expectation that parties consider the use of technology to exchange 
document data. There was initially some considerable variation in the number 
of documents specified, but the number now specified in each of New South 
Wales, the Northern Territory, South Australia and the Federal Court is 500.84 
                                                 
83 Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2003] FCA 
977. 
84 New South Wales: Practice Note SC Gen 7 Supreme Court – Use of Technology, 
published 15 August 2006 with effect from 1 September 2006; NT: Practice 
Direction No 2 of 2002, Guidelines for the use of Technology in any Civil Matter, 
published 13.2.2002; SA: Practice Direction 2.1 of Supreme Court Practice 
Directions 2006 (SA) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Technology, with effect 
from 4.9.2006 in relation to actions governed by Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006. 
This Practice Direction refers to the number of documents likely to be disclosed is 
more than 500, or when the estimated length of hearing is more than four weeks. 
(The previous Practice Direction (Supreme Court Practice Direction 52) continues to 
apply to actions governed by the Rules of Supreme Court 1987. It requires parties to 
consider exchanging details in an agreed electronic format using agreed fields and to 
consider the use of document images if they believe they will be discovering more 
than 200 documents between them.); Federal Court: Practice Note 17 Guidelines for 
the Use of Technology in Litigation in any Civil Matter, published April 2000.  
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This is also the number specified in Queensland as a trigger for parties’ 
consideration of the use of technology at trial.85 The threshold number of 
documents under the previous Victorian Practice Direction was 50086, but the 
new Practice Direction in that jurisdiction requires consideration of the use of 
technology “where it might lead to the more efficient conduct of litigation.”87 
 
There is no doubt that there is among many in the profession a view that 
electronic document management and disclosure is a last resort, to be 
embarked upon only when the volume of documents to be dealt with is such 
that it cannot possibly be managed by a manual method. Certainly there will 
need to be a significant culture shift before the profession generally embraces 
technology for matters involving only the sorts of numbers referred to in the 
practice notes. 
 
There is, however, a contrasting and perhaps “modern” school of thought that 
today firms should elect to use litigation support systems as a standard means 
of litigation management. That has become the norm in many large litigation 
practices, where internal document management systems are used as a matter 
of course. Certainly this thinking is urged on the profession as general best 
practice by those involved in the litigation support services industry,88 as you 
would expect! 
 
When documents are first to be converted from hard copy documents to an 
electronic format the truth probably lies somewhere between these two 
extremes and perhaps the most that can be definitively stated to date is that 
the larger the matter the more likely that the use of technology both pre-trial 
and at trial will be the most efficient method of conducting the proceeding.  
 
It is clear, however, that as procedures are developed for the discovery and 
processing of documents in their native electronic format and this becomes 
common place, the use of litigation support systems will increasingly become 
the standard practice for litigation management. 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Practice Direction No 8 of 2004, issued 13.7.2004. 
86 Practice Note, No 1 of 2002 Guidelines for the use of Technology in any Civil 
Matter, published 29.4.2002. 
87 Practice Note No 1 of 2007, Guidelines for the Use of Technology in any Civil 
Litigation Matter, issued 8.2.2007.  
88 See eg Deborah Coram and Adam Seskis, above n 62, 15. 
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V TIMING OF DIRECTION 
 
 
A question which must be determined in the context of the adoption of 
technology in the litigation process is the time when the court or the parties 
should consider that technology be adopted, either pre-trial or at trial.  
 
If a trial is to be conducted electronically it is clearly preferable that the 
decision in that regard be made as soon as possible. One of the obvious 
reasons for this to give adequate time for the preparations for conduct of the 
electronic trial. It will be necessary to discuss the parties’ requirements with a 
service provider and to customise software. It will also be necessary to 
arrange the provision of hardware. The individuals who will be involved in 
the trial process will need time to become familiar with the use of the system 
chosen and to undergo appropriate training. Depending upon whether a 
technician is to be employed and available in court throughout the trial it may 
be necessary to train court staff in the operation of the system. If the decision 
to conduct the trial electronically is not taken at an early stage there is a 
strong potential that the undertaking of these necessary pre-trial preparations 
may cause delay. 
 
Another key advantage of an early decision in relation to the conduct of the 
trial is that it is then more likely that efficient use may be made of technology 
in the pre-trial process. Byrne J observed in Kennedy Taylor (Vic) Pty Ltd v 
Grocon Pty Ltd (“Kennedy Taylor”)89: 
 
Experience shows that the later the decision to conduct the trial in 
electronic form is taken, the consequent savings of time and cost at 
trial and in preparation for the trial are less. 
 
If the decision to use technology is taken at an early stage the parties will 
clearly adopt technology in the pre-trial stages. When an electronic database 
is used in this way it is a quick and simple process to transfer data to the 
courtbook. A range of other benefits that follow from the adoption of a 
quality document management system have already been discussed.  
 
If the decision is taken at a later stage and document management systems are 
not used for all documents to be discovered or disclosed, it may be 
appropriate for the court to require that only a more restricted range of 
documents be scanned and coded and uploaded to an electronic database. In 
                                                 
89 [2002] VSC 32 at [17]. 
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Kennedy Taylor
90 Byrne J was called upon to determine the scope and 
content of the databases to be used in conjunction with the electronic 
courtbook. Orders had been made for the preparation of an electronic 
courtbook and the plaintiffs applied to expand the scope of the documents to 
be included. The defendant opposed the application. Byrne J described the 
test as to which documents should be included in a database being established 
for use at trial in these terms:91 
 
To my mind, a preferable test is “documents which are reasonably 
expected to be tendered or used at trial”. This formulation 
acknowledges the reality that a relevant document might be put to a 
witness or otherwise used at trial without its being tendered. In such 
an event, there is likely to be a saving of trial time and costs, and a 
minimisation of inconvenience for all parties and the witness, as well 
as for the Court, if all of these are working from a common paginated 
bundle of documents. 
 
His Honour declined to make the order sought. Though clearly satisfied he 
had the power to do so his Honour was not persuaded that the benefits to be 
derived from ordering the inclusion of additional documents as sought by the 
plaintiffs would outweigh the costs. He found the plaintiffs had not shown 
that the proposed extension of the database would “have the consequence that 
the trial of this proceeding will be more completely, promptly, and 
economically determined”.92 
 
The issue as to the appropriate timing for a direction that a trial proceed 
electronically was also considered by Bleby J in Harris Scarfe.93 In that case 
it was argued for the second and third defendants that the proceedings were 
not sufficiently advanced for an informed decision to be made as to the use of 
an electronic court and that the decision should be delayed until at least the 
finalisation of pleadings and expert reports and ideally until notices to admit 
and tender lists had been prepared.  
 
Bleby J referred to the decision of Byrne J in Kennedy Taylor (Vic) Pty Ltd v 
Grocon Pty Ltd,
94 as discussed above. He disagreed that it was too early to 
decide whether an electronic court would be of assistance. He found there 
                                                 
90 [2002] VSC 32 at [17]. 
91 [2002] VSC 32 at [15]. 
92 [2002] VSC 32 at [23]. 
93 Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407 at [27]-[36]. 
94 [2002] VSC 32. 
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were numerous aspects of the matter which pointed to the conclusion that, 
whatever changes might be made to the pleadings and expert reports, the use 
of an electronic court for the trial was appropriate.  
 
His Honour was also of the view that it could only assist in the preparation of 
notices to admit, tender lists and the timely preparation of a court book to 
have the arrangements in place at an early stage. He conceded that the exact 
course of the trial could not be predicted and that the tendering of some 
documents would necessarily depend on forensic decisions made by counsel 
at a later stage, so that it was possible that some documents which would 
have to be included may never be used. He noted, however, that the decisions 
as to what should be included in the courtbook and when would depend not 
only on progressive clarification of issues but on advice as to timing and 
technical matters by the service provider and co-operation of the parties. In 
the event of dispute as to the content or timing it would of course be possible 
to make further recourse to directions of the Court. 
 
The second and third defendants in Harris Scarfe95 also raised the issue that 
some documents may need to be provided in hard copy form in order to view 
and comprehend the document clearly. Although conceding it was inevitable 
that some original documents would need to be produced during the course of 
the trial, Bleby J found this to be insufficient to outweigh all of the benefits 
of an electronic court. His Honour did not consider it likely that such a large 
number of documents would fall into this category so as to render the use of 
electronic images pointless. He proceeded96: 
 
The orders I propose to make will not require the uploading of every 
single discovered document. Furthermore, a substantial number of 
the documents to be entered will not require scanning because they 
are already in and were produced in electronic form. Therefore I do 
not foresee the imposition of huge expense in establishing the 
database. 
 
Consistent with both authority and the practice directions which have been 
discussed, it is clear that parties should direct their minds very early in the 
litigation process to the question whether technology should be adopted. It is 
submitted the crucial point is that at which it has become apparent that the 
benefits to be derived from the use of technology, whether in terms of costs 
and efficiency, or having regard also to other considerations relating to the 
                                                 
95 Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407 at [35]. 
96 [2005] SASC 407 at [36]. 
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administration of justice which may result from the use of technology pre-
trial or at trial, justifies the costs associated with the adoption of the 
technology. At that point the parties should proceed electronically, and if 
necessary the court may be expected to make the appropriate orders. 
 
 
VI EXPENSE 
 
If parties agree that the proceedings between them should be conducted in an 
electronic court it is obviously preferable that they reach agreement on issues 
relating to the associated costs, including what costs should be encompassed, 
how the costs should be assessed and which party should bear them. In the 
absence of agreement a number of issues in relation to the costs may arise. 
The court had to consider a number of such questions in both Kennedy 
Taylor
97 and Harris Scarfe98. 
 
One key question is how the expense associated with the establishment and 
use of an electronic court should be borne, particularly if the court orders on 
an opposed application that the trial in the proceeding be conducted 
electronically. It is submitted, however, that there are no unique features 
involved with the use of an electronic court which warrant a departure from 
normal rules about costs and that those rules are well able to provide 
adequate compensation in relation to costs once a matter has been 
determined.99  
 
The issue was considered in some detail in Harris Scarfe100, where one of the 
issues raised by the second and third defendants was that they should not be 
forced to incur the expense associated with the use of an electronic court 
against their will. The submission was, however, rightly rejected. As Bleby J 
observed,101 the defendants’ costs in relation to the use of technology, at least 
initially, were no different from any other costs necessarily and properly 
incurred in the defence of the claim against them. His Honour considered that 
in South Australia, as in other jurisdictions, costs payable to the technology 
                                                 
97 Kennedy Taylor (Vic) Pty Ltd v Grocon Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 32. 
98 Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407. 
99 Although the issue of liability for costs is arguably encompassed appropriately by 
the Rules of Court, a related issue is the extent to which traditional scales of costs, 
and approaches to the interpretation of these scales, provides adequate recompense 
for the party who is entitled to recover costs associated with the use of technology.  
100 Harris Scarfe v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2005] SASC 407. 
101 [2005] SASC 407 at [39]. 
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service provider will fall into the category described in Rule 101.07(6)(a) as 
those “necessarily and reasonably incurred by [a] party in the conduct of the 
litigation”.102 He found no reason to distinguish the manner in which costs of 
using an electronic court should be treated from any other disbursement and 
that those costs could be dealt with in the usual fashion when it came to 
taxation of a party’s costs. 
 
The usual presumption in most jurisdictions as to the ultimate liability for 
costs is that costs should follow the event.103 Ordinarily the use of an 
electronic court would not of itself warrant a departure from this 
presumption. As Bleby J concluded in Harris Scarfe, if there were 
circumstances in which costs, including those associated with the use of 
technology, were to be thrown away, as for example by one party abandoning 
a particular aspect of their case, then any application in that respect would be 
decided and assessed on ordinary principles. 
 
In Harris Scarfe104 the second and third defendants also submitted that the 
plaintiffs should bear, at least initially, the entire cost of the use of the 
electronic court in case it turned out that the technology did not assist in the 
expeditious conduct of the litigation. Bleby J did not find it necessary to 
consider this submission at that stage of the proceedings. Consistent with his 
Honour’s earlier discussion in relation to the benefits of technology he did 
indicate, however, that he considered it unlikely that the electronic court 
would prove to be an entirely wasteful exercise.105 It is certainly difficult to 
                                                 
102 Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 101.07 (6)(a). (See now Supreme Court Civil 
Rules 2006 (SA), r264(2), which specifies that “as a general rule, however, costs are 
awarded as between party and party (that is, on the basis that the party entitled to the 
costs will be reimbursed for costs reasonably incurred by the party in the conduct of 
the litigation to an extent determined by reference to the scale of costs in force, under 
these rules or the previous rules, when the costs were incurred)”). The following 
rules are in similar terms: Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r 1751; Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 703; Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) r 859; Supreme 
Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 1998 (Vic) r 63.29; Federal Court 
Rules O 62 r 19. See also the definition in Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 364, 
incorporated into the definition of “ordinary basis” of assessment by Uniform Civil 
Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 3. 
103 Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 101.02(1); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 
(SA) r263(1). See also Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 42.1; Uniform 
Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 689(1); Supreme Court (General Civil 
Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic); Rules of Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 66 r 1.  
104 [2005] SASC 407 at [39]. 
105 [2005] SASC 407 at [38]. 
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envisage circumstances in which there would not be some costs savings 
resulting from the conduct of a trial with the use of technology, although it 
has been seen that there has been no research to date as to the precise 
circumstances in which the conduct of a trial electronically is ultimately more 
efficient and cost-effective than traditional means. It is submitted that if a 
party who is liable to pay costs is to benefit from whatever costs savings are 
made through the use of technology, it is logical and appropriate that the 
party also bear the costs associated with the use of technology, whether the 
use of the technology is by agreement between the parties or on the order of 
the court. 
 
If it is accepted that it is to be expected that in the ordinary course the costs 
associated with the use of technology will be part of the party and party costs 
recoverable by the successful party the question becomes what costs will be 
encompassed. The decision in Kennedy Taylor (Vic) Pty Ltd v Grocon Pty 
Ltd
106 throws some light on that question. The trial in that matter was to 
proceed electronically and directions had been given requiring the 
preparation of an electronic data base of documents for the trial. It had been 
agreed between the parties that the costs would include107 the acquisition of 
software (including necessary licences), fees payable to external information 
technology consultants, the scanning of documents, and the coding of 
documents in accordance with an agreed protocol.  
 
The particular application before the court was one brought by the plaintiffs. 
They sought an order that all reasonable costs associated with the application 
of information technology to the preparation for trial, and the trial itself, 
should be regarded as necessary or proper costs for the purpose of taxation of 
costs108. The defendant and third party proposed a more restricted order that 
would extend only to the costs associated with the application of technology 
to preparation of the court book or otherwise with any order of the court. On 
the hearing of the application it became clear that the point of difference 
between the parties related to the ambit of the database of documents. The 
plaintiff sought to have all, or nearly all, discovered documents included, 
whereas the other parties desired a much more restricted database resembling 
                                                 
106 [2002] VSC 32. 
107 Kennedy Taylor v Grocon Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 32 (see esp at [11]).  
108 Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 1998 (Vic) rule 63. Rule 
63.29 provides that “On a taxation on a party and party basis all costs necessary or 
proper for the attainment of justice or for enforcing or defending the rights of the 
party whose costs are being taxed shall be allowed.” 
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a traditional court book in electronic form or comprising at most “only those 
documents with a reasonable prospect of being tendered.”109 
 
The judge considered the usual practice in relation to the preparation of court 
books and noted that in the ordinary course they should contain “documents 
which are reasonably expected to be tendered at the trial110. In his Honour’s 
view the position was the same if the trial was an electronic one, using 
imaged documents. He noted, however, that the facility with which 
documents may be imaged and managed electronically did, however, bear on 
the principle. This may mean that in a given case an electronic library 
containing all, or nearly all, the discovered documents, would be no more 
expensive, or even cheaper, than an electronic courtbook. This would depend 
upon whether all discovered documents had been imaged, as if they had there 
would in all likelihood be little further costs involved in transferring the 
images of all, rather than a selection of them, to the database for use at trial. 
Indeed, as his Honour pointed out, there may be a saving in the long term, as 
the task of selection will involve professional time and expense.  
 
In considering issues in relation to expense it should finally be noted that in 
addition to the issues that relate to the adoption of technology pre-trial and at 
trial costs issues also arise in relation to the discovery of documents that exist 
only in electronic form. Discoverable information may be held in a relatively 
accessible storage medium, such as on a server’s hard disk. However back-up 
tapes, which are often held off-site and require additional user intervention to 
restore, are by their nature much more difficult to access.111 Difficulties will 
also arise in accessing electronic data which has been erased or damaged. The 
process of retrieving electronic information of this kind, sifting through it to 
locate content that should be discovered, and converting it into a suitable 
format for provision to the other parties, can be an extremely burdensome and 
expensive process. The usual position will be that the associated costs will be 
part of the party and party costs ultimately recoverable by the successful 
party, but in some instances it may be appropriate to ask the court to order 
that at least part of the costs be paid up front by the party to whom discovery 
is to be made.112 
                                                 
109 [2002] VSC 32 at [8]. 
110 [2002] VSC 32 at [15]. 
111 The costs associated with the restoration of backup tapes was considered in BT 
Australasia Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [1998] FCA 363 and in Sony Music 
Entertainment (Australia) Limited v University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 532. 
112 See Farrell B, “So much for Cheap Technology” (2003) 53 Computers & Law 13. 
The author there argues that Australia should look to the model developed in the 
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VII OPEN JUSTICE IN AN E-TRIAL? 
 
 
It is the position at general law that judgments and orders of the court are 
public documents which the public have a general right to inspect. Pleadings, 
affidavits and other documents merely filed in court are not open to public 
inspection.113 In each jurisdiction the rules of court govern the extent to 
which the public may access documents in a proceeding. These rules reflect 
an aspect of the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control and superintend 
its own proceedings so as to protect and further the due administration of 
justice.114  
 
In some jurisdictions the rules of court expand the general law significantly. 
In Queensland the public can inspect any document in a court file, subject to 
any court order restricting access to the file or document or the file or 
document being required for the court’s use.115 In Victoria the public may 
obtain copies of any document filed in a proceeding except documents which 
the court has ordered remain confidential, or one which in the opinion of the 
prothonotary ought to remain confidential to the parties.116 In the High Court, 
most documents may be inspected, but affidavits and exhibits to affidavits 
which have not been received in evidence in court, and documents containing 
information disclosing the identity of a person if the disclosure is in any way 
prohibited, are excluded.117 In the Australian Capital Territory, the general 
principle is that anyone may search the registry for, or take a copy of, any 
document filed in the registry118 but this is qualified in respect of an extensive 
range of documents which may only be inspected with the court’s leave.119 In 
other jurisdictions the rules of court express in large measure the general law. 
                                                                                                                    
United States in Zubalake I, 2003 US Dist Lexis 7939, 2003 WL 21087884 and 
Zubalake II, 216 FRD 280; 200 3 US Dist Lexis 12643 in relation to how costs of 
complying with orders for electronic document production should be met. 
113 Titelius v Public Service Appeal Board (1999) 21 WAR 201 at 223, 225. 
114 Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Rich [2002] NSWSC 198. 
115 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 981. 
116 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic) r 28.05. 
117 High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 4.07.4. 
118 Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r 2903(1). 
119 Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r 2903(2). The documents specified include 
affidavits that have not been read in court, unsworn statements of evidence, 
documents that the court has ordered to be kept confidential, and documents that the 
registrar decides should be confidential to the parties to the proceeding in the 
interests of justice. 
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In Western Australia120 and the Federal Court121, for example, the rules define 
the documents in a proceeding that a person may inspect in the Registry, and 
also those which may not be accessed by a person who is not a party to the 
proceeding without the leave of the court or registrar. The documents 
requiring leave before access may be granted include affidavits and unsworn 
statements of evidence.122 In Tasmania a similar situation prevails, and non-
parties are not permitted to inspect most documents without the leave of the 
court.123 The position in New South Wales is more restrictive, with access to 
all material in any proceedings being available only to the parties, except 
with the leave of the court.124  
 
When a trial is proceeding issues of public access to evidentiary material are 
in the inherent jurisdiction of the trial judge.125 If leave is sought based on the 
principle of open justice factors that will influence the court in the exercise of 
the discretion include: the extent to which the document has been referred to 
in open court, the stage reached in the proceedings, the contents of the 
document, whether access to the document is necessary or desirable for 
understanding the proceedings, and the purpose for which access is 
required.126  
 
For cases which have attracted significant public attention and are being 
heard in open court, media interests may well seek to inspect and copy 
documents from the court file. The court may be expected to grant leave to 
inspect a filed document which has been relied on in the course of the hearing 
if that will aid the media interest concerned to understand what has transpired 
in court, and so to allow informed reporting of the case.  
The conduct of a trial electronically presents a range of extra issues to be 
considered in the context of access to documents. The technology used at trial 
can include a facility permitting documents to which reference is being made 
                                                 
120 Rules of the Supreme Court 1979 (WA) O 67 r 11. 
121 Federal Court Rules O 46 r 6. 
122 In the ordinary course expert reports will be exhibited or annexed to affidavits or 
witness statements and so they are effectively in the same position. 
123 Supreme Court Rules 200 (Tas) r 33. The documents excluded are: any documents 
relating to proceedings in chambers, affidavits, interrogatories and answers to 
interrogatories, lists of documents given on discovery, admissions taken on 
deposition, subpoena or documents lodged in answer to a subpoena, and any 
document which the registrar considers ought to remain confidential to the parties. 
124 Practice Note SCGen 2 Supreme Court – Access to Court Files, 17.8.05. 
125 Hammond v Scheinberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 49 at 50, 52. 
126 Van Stokkum v Finance Brokers Supervisory Board [2002] WASC 192. 
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to be displayed on larger screens that can be viewed by members of the 
public (including the media).  
 
A regime may be established to deal with documents in respect of which 
confidentiality orders are in place. It is possible to display documents on the 
screens available to the judge or to the legal representatives only and not on 
the public screens. It is also possible to edit statements admitted into 
evidence so as to exclude material rejected on evidentiary grounds so that 
when the statements are brought up onto the screens the rejected material 
does not appear. The ease with which exhibits may be transmitted, however, 
magnifies the risk that a party will be exposed to publication of confidential 
or sensitive material that will have no bearing on the outcome of the case as 
there are considerable practical difficulties facing parties in satisfying 
themselves that all confidential material has been identified and 
accommodated by the appropriate confidentiality regime.  
 
The weighing of interests of open justice against the proper protection of 
confidentiality and other interests of parties involving in proceedings was an 
issue for consideration in the course of the trial in Seven Network Ltd v News 
Ltd (No 9).
127 In that case the Seven Network brought proceedings seeking 
relief against 22 respondents alleging, inter alia, collusive conduct by most 
respondents in relation to the bidding rights to Australian Football League 
and National Rugby League Games. The case was conducted in an electronic 
court. The electronic document database contained over 75,000 documents. 
As documents on the database were referred to they were usually brought up 
on computer screens accessible by the legal representatives and the court, and 
also on larger screens that could be viewed by members of the public, 
including the media. A regime had been established to deal with documents 
that were the subject of confidentiality orders. 
 
Some days into the proceeding (then estimated to run between 6 and 8 
months) the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (“ABC”), which was not a 
party to the proceedings, filed a motion under the Federal Court Rules, O 46 
r 6 seeking leave to inspect and have access to all affidavits, witness 
statements and expert reports in evidence, and also to all exhibits, written 
submissions and transcript. No access was sought to documents the subject of 
                                                 
127 [2005] FCA 1394 at [4]-[7]. Sackville J further discussed the dimensions of the 
litigation and the use of the electronic courtroom when delivering judgment after the 
conclusion of the proceeding: Seven Network Limited v News Limited [2007] FCA 
1062 at [6]-[9]. 
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an order under s 50 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth)128 or any other order 
for confidentiality. 
 
There was no opposition by the parties to access being given to the ABC (and 
therefore other media outlets) to the pleadings, those parts of affidavits, 
witness statements and expert reports admitted into evidence, written 
submissions and the transcript. The significant dispute related to non-
confidential exhibits which had not been referred to in the course of evidence 
or oral argument or in written submissions provided to the Court.  
 
For the ABC it was urged that the principle of open justice required the 
making of the order sought. Sackville J acknowledged the importance of the 
principle that the administration of justice must take place in open court129 
and was satisfied that considerable weight should be given to the principle.130 
His Honour noted131, however, that it was established that open justice is a 
principle and not a “freestanding right”132 and it had to be weighed against 
other principles or policies that needed to be taken into account. 
 
The conduct of an electronic trial was contrasted with the position of a 
traditional “hard copy” trial. In a traditional trial, public access is usually 
decided on a document by document basis and there are associated practical 
constraints of time and cost associated with copying, storing and searching 
the documentary evidence. On the other hand exhibits may be transmitted 
through the use of technology at trial with extraordinary ease, and special 
care is required to protect the legitimate interests of the parties. Sackville J 
accepted that the sheer volume of documents that had been or would be 
tendered at trial, and the time frame in which the parties were required to 
prepare for trial, meant there was a serious risk that some material would be 
allowed into evidence by default or by error and also that the parties may fail 
                                                 
128 Section 50 provides that the court may, at any time during or after the hearing of a 
proceeding in the Court, make such order forbidding or restricting the publication of 
particular evidence, or the name of a party or witness, as appears to the court to be 
necessary in order to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice or the security 
of the Commonwealth. 
129 Authorities to which he referred in relation to the principle of open justice and the 
rationale for it included: Macquarie Radio Network v The Australian Broadcasting 
Authority [2002] FCA 1408; R v Davis (1995) 57 FCR 512; Russell v Russell (1976) 
134 CLR 495. 
130 [2005] FCA 1394 at [28]. 
131 [2005] FCA 1394 at [23]. 
132 See John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court [2005] NSWCA 101 at 
[29] per Spigelman CJ (with whom Mason P and Beazley JA agreed). 
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to claim confidentiality in respect of documents for which such a claim could 
legitimately be made.  
 
Having weighed the competing considerations, Sackville J concluded that the 
ABC should have access to exhibits only when they are referred to in the 
course of evidence or oral argument or in written submissions provided to the 
Court. 
 
 
VIII CONCLUSION 
 
Much progress has been made in recent years in adopting technology for use 
in the litigation process and it may fairly be said that technology is now 
wholeheartedly embraced by some practitioners and also by some members 
of the judiciary.  
 
In cases involving large numbers of documents it is now not uncommon to 
find that parties are able to reach agreement on the adoption of technology 
both pre-trial and at trial, although there may be associated issues which 
remain in dispute. In Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 9)133, for example, 
there was no issue about whether an electronic courtroom should be used, but 
rather about access to documents transmitted through the use of the 
technology at trial. 
  
Certainly in cases where it can be shown to be in the interests of justice for a 
matter to proceed electronically it is clear the courts can and will make 
appropriate directions, whether or not desired by all parties to the litigation. 
These will include the use of a technology court for the trial.  
 
In most jurisdictions there are strategies in place to establish electronic 
courtroom facilities and other services for judges, litigants and their legal 
representatives, and a number of courtrooms equipped with various 
technological facilities such as internet access, power points, support for “real 
time” transcript, and video-conferencing facilities.134 The demand for these 
                                                 
133 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 9) [2005] FCA 1394.  
134 In most jurisdictions the Supreme Court websites provide information as to the 
technology available for use or set up in particular courtrooms. See eg :the Supreme 
Court of Victoria website at 
http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/CA256CC60028922C/page/Courtroom+Techno
logy?OpenDocument&1=90-Courtroom+Technology~&2=~&3=~ and the Supreme 
Court of Queensland website at: http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/about/technology.htm.  
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facilities will undoubtedly increase. Law graduates are entering the 
workforce with higher levels of competence in the use of information 
technology than ever before, and many have specialist knowledge of 
electronic litigation processes.135 In addition the need to deal with disclosure 
of electronic documents in their native format will undoubtedly force 
practitioners to embrace the use of technology in the litigation process. 
  
The courts have already begun to consider a range of issues that arise from 
the use of technology in pre-trial and trial processes. They will need to 
grapple with many more as the slow but inevitable culture shift in the 
profession occurs in Australia and the conduct of litigation electronically 
becomes the norm in everyday litigation practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
135 A number of Law Schools now have custom-built fully electronic moot courts, 
including the Queensland University of Technology, Murdoch University, the 
University of Canberra, and the University of Melbourne. Several, including the 
Queensland University of Technology and Murdoch University, also offer students 
specialist units in electronic litigation.  
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